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Effort in Multitasking: Local and
Global Assessment of Effort
Andrea Kiesel* and David Dignath
Department of Psychology, Cognition, Action, and Sustainability Unit, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany
When performing multiple tasks in succession, self-organization of task order might
be superior compared to external-controlled task schedules, because self-organization
allows optimizing processing modes and thus reduces switch costs, and it increases
commitment to task goals. However, self-organization is an additional executive control
process that is not required if task order is externally specified and as such it is
considered as time-consuming and effortful. To compare self-organized and externally
controlled task scheduling, we suggest assessing global subjective and objectives
measures of effort in addition to local performance measures. In our new experimental
approach, we combined characteristics of dual tasking settings and task switching
settings and compared local and global measures of effort in a condition with free
choice of task sequence and a condition with cued task sequence. In a multi-tasking
environment, participants chose the task order while the task requirement of the not-yet-
performed task remained the same. This task preview allowed participants to work on
the previously non-chosen items in parallel and resulted in faster responses and fewer
errors in task switch trials than in task repetition trials. The free-choice group profited
more from this task preview than the cued group when considering local performance
measures. Nevertheless, the free-choice group invested more effort than the cued group
when considering global measures. Thus, self-organization in task scheduling seems to
be effortful even in conditions in which it is beneficiary for task processing. In a second
experiment, we reduced the possibility of task preview for the not-yet-performed tasks
in order to hinder efficient self-organization. Here neither local nor global measures
revealed substantial differences between the free-choice and a cued task sequence
condition. Based on the results of both experiments, we suggest that global assessment
of effort in addition to local performance measures might be a useful tool for multitasking
research.
Keywords: multitasking, task switching, cognitive control, voluntary action, voluntary task switching
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life multiple cognitive task requirements are omnipresent and occur in many different
contexts. For example, teachers concurrently observe the behavior of problematic pupils while
they are engaged in explaining a mathematical procedure, a text passage, etc. Surgeons have to
concurrently track the vital functions of the patient while they are engaged in opening the ribcage.
Working in an office requires performing cognitive tasks like planning the budget or evaluating the
outcome of the work group, and these tasks might be interrupted by phone calls, incoming emails
or colleagues/students knocking at the door. And, finally, managing a household with children
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permanently requires engaging and disengaging in several tasks
like planning a dinner, looking out for sources of dangers for just-
walking children, answering questions of older children etc. Thus,
multiple cognitive task requirements are a societal fact and one
can hardly avoid them.
While multitasking is generally costly, there might be
factors that help people to cope better with multitasking. Self-
organization of task choice and task scheduling certainly is
such a factor. However, self-organization is also a process
that requires additional control. Consequently, we reason that
while some conditions might be beneficial for multitasking in
terms of better task performance, this will come at a cost in
terms of more effort required. Therefore, we focus not only
on local performance measures, but also on global measures
of effort in terms of subjective and objective measures. As a
first step, we aim to present a new experimental approach to
compare conditions in which participants themselves organize
how to cope with multiple cognitive task requirements with
conditions in which task organization is externally controlled
and thus task scheduling is pre-determined. In the experimental
task, we combine properties of dual tasking and task switching
paradigms by allowing for parallel processing of different tasks
in a protocol that requires the rapid alternation between
tasks. By this, we present an experimental set-up that allows
the independent assessment of local and global costs of self-
organization processes during multitasking. While the process of
self-organization itself has been investigated elsewhere, the focus
of this research is on a possible trade-off between local and global
measures.
The comparison between self-organized and externally
controlled task scheduling is empirically and theoretically
especially interesting because different lines of psychological
research allow opposing hypotheses. First, research in PRP
studies that allowed participants to freely choose task order,
revealed that several factors, like for example, expectation of
stimulus order or repetition of task order (De Jong, 1995),
distribution of stimulus onset asynchronies between Task 1 and
Task 2 stimuli (Miller et al., 2009), duration of central processing
stages of Task 1 and 2 (Leonhard et al., 2011; Ruiz Fernández
et al., 2011) or duration of motor responses (Ruiz Fernández
et al., 2013) impact on whether participants perform Task 1 or
Task 2 first. These findings are in line with the assumption of
a higher-order control process that determines task order and
preparation for the tasks (e.g., De Jong, 1995; Luria and Meiran,
2003; Szameitat et al., 2006). Recent theorizing assumed that
task order in conditions with varying distribution of stimulus
onset asynchronies might be chosen in a way that optimizes task
performance (see Miller et al., 2009 for an optimization account).
Consequently, conditions that enable to self-organize task order
might be advantageous compared to conditions with externally
controlled task order.
Similarly, recent research in the voluntary task switching
paradigm suggests that self-organization might be advantageous
over cued task switching. In voluntary task switching settings,
participants freely choose which task to perform in the next trial
whereas in cued task switching settings, a cue is presented prior to
each target instructing participants which task to perform in the
next trial. Switch costs, that is the RT difference for task switch
and task repetition trials, are smaller in voluntary task switching
settings compared to cued task switching (e.g., Arrington and
Logan, 2005; Mayr and Bell, 2006; Demanet and Liefooghe, 2014).
And finally, within applied work psychology, researchers
predict that self-organized task performance is superior to fixed
task scheduling. With regards to this assumption, the self-
regulation theory of Hacker (e.g., Hacker, 2009) claims that
goals and plans are relevant to regulate one’s action. Further,
commitment to these goals seems especially high if workers
participate in the goal-setting process (e.g., Pritchard et al., 1993;
Kleinbeck and Schmidt, 2004). Indeed, there are even norms
that request holistic and complete work activities (ISO 6385, EN
DIN 29241-2, cited in Hacker, 2009). Thus, from this perspective
self-organized task-scheduling likewise might be considered as
favorable compared to fixed task scheduling.
On the other hand, however, self-organization is an extra
cognitive processes that is not required if task order is externally
controlled. This process to choose tasks/task order to optimize
performance is conceptualized as an executive control process
(e.g., Logan, 1985; Norman and Shallice, 1986) and as such
it is considered as time-consuming and effortful. However,
previous research might not be ideal to investigate this process
for several reasons. For instance, task choice often takes place
prior to stimulus presentation. We argue that if this is the
case, participants cannot actually choose task order to optimize
their performance because they do not know the exact task
requirements for the respective trial. Instead participants have
to base their task choice on rather broad requirements of the
tasks in general. Consider the case of a participant choosing
between a math and letter identification task. If the participant
has to decide prior to stimulus presentation, she can recall
some rather abstract features of the task (e.g., in the math
task, I have to do simple computations) and will probably
base her decision on her assessment of the anticipated level of
difficulty. We will call this a proactive, memory-driven strategy.
In contrast, if the participant has to decide after stimulus
presentation, she can compare the different items based on
specific features (e.g., in the math task, I have to subtract
4 from 9). Consequently, her decision will be based on her
assessment of the actual level of difficulty. We will refer to
this as a reactive, stimulus-driven strategy. Arguably, it is
much easier to choose the’ best’ task (in terms of time and
effort invested in solving the task) if participants can apply a
stimulus-driven strategy, because the memory-driven strategy
has two disadvantages. First, with a memory-driven strategy,
optimization is restricted to abstract features and therefore
preparation will be necessarily limited. Second, with limited time
and more than two alternatives, memory recall will be rather
demanding, making it less likely those participants will use this
strategy at all.
Further, we aim to assess effort and performance in
a multitasking setting that actually requires participants to
schedule task order. For this, we opted for a setting in which
the items of the non-chosen tasks remained the same. Thus,
participants are not simply able to apply a stimulus-driven
strategy to choose the item that is easiest to perform in a
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given trial, but they are able to choose task order such that
the order of items is optimized (at least to some degree for
the respectively next items of each task). By this, our setting
also better resembles everyday multitasking because we require
participants to schedule the task order while the affordances
(e.g., stimuli for a task) for the not-yet-performed tasks remain1.
To summarize, while previous research investigated task choice
mostly for memory-driven strategies, we believe that this actually
limited the possibilities to optimize the task choice process.
Therefore, the present research aimed to maximize the possibility
that participants make use of a stimulus-driven strategy. More
precisely, we reason that presentation of specific items prior
to task choice will most likely facilitate performance, because
participants can select (and solve) tasks based on their actual
difficulty.
However, if task choice is optimized (in terms of better
performance), the cognitive effort related to this optimization
process cannot be assessed with traditional measures of task
performance. Indeed, research in PRP and task switching settings
usually did not assess overall effort to handle the experimental
requirements. Consequently, to arrive at a more complete picture
of task optimization, it is crucial to assess both global and local
measures when comparing effort for self-organized compared to
externally controlled task scheduling.
In this paper, we aim to consider both – local performance
measures and global effort measure to compare self-organized
and externally controlled task scheduling when confronted with
multiple cognitive requirements. Indeed, there are many studies
comparing voluntary and cued task switching performance while
assessing local performance data. Yet, results are ambiguous.
Although studies unequivocally revealed that switch costs are
smaller in voluntary task switching settings compared to cued
task switching (e.g., Arrington and Logan, 2005; Mayr and Bell,
2006; Demanet and Liefooghe, 2014), the result patterns diverge
when considering overall RT level. Mayr and Bell (2006) and
Demanet and Liefooghe (2014) observed faster RTs for voluntary
task choice compared to cued task order, yet Arrington and Logan
(2005) reported in 4 of 5 experiments slower RTs for voluntary
task choice compared to cued task order (see also Chen and
Hsieh, 2013).
In addition, studies comparing performance in voluntary
and cued task switching settings usually did not control for
task transition effects. In cued task switching settings, task
order is random and consequently frequency of task switches
is approximately 50% (for settings with two tasks). Yet, if
participants freely choose tasks, frequency of task switches usually
differs from chance because participants repeat tasks more often
as expected by random task choices (e.g., Arrington and Logan,
2004, 2005; Mayr and Bell, 2006; Yeung, 2010; Reuss et al., 2011).
A fair comparison of performance in voluntary and cued task
switching settings requires controlling for task transition effects.
This is intended in the current study by applying a yoked design.
1Indeed, repeating non-chosen items allows for very different optimization
processes compared to situations with new items for each task. In the latter case
(and with the requirement to choose only one task) it would be best to choose
the easiest task that can be performed fastest. In most trials, this would mean that
participants repeat the task without any further consideration of task sequences.
That is, for each participant in the free choice condition, there is
one participant in the cued condition who is cued to perform the
tasks in exactly the same task order as chosen by the participant
in the free choice condition (for a similar attempt see Panepinto,
2010; Masson and Carruthers, 2014).
To conclude, experimental settings in voluntary task switching
studies differ from everyday task performance and do no foster
task scheduling that optimizes performance. Participants have
to choose which type of task to perform without knowing the
exact task requirements based on a memory-driven strategy. In
addition, the items for the non-chosen task do not remain while
in everyday life not-yet-performed task requirements usually
do not change. Indeed, only if the exact task item is known,
participants can choose a task and/ or select task order according
to a stimulus driven strategy, allowing for an optimization of task
choices.
EXPERIMENT 1
To compare performance and effort for self-organized compared
to externally controlled multiple cognitive task requirements, we
compared a free-choice group and a cued task switching group
in a yoked design. We applied a new experimental paradigm
that combines characteristics of PRP and task switching settings.
Participants were requested to perform four different tasks: a
summation task, a subtraction task, a distance month task,
and an alphabetical distance task. For the summation task and
the subtraction task, two one-digit numbers had to be added
or subtracted. The distance month task required counting the
amount of months from a start to an end month. For example,
the item “January>> February” required the response 1 and the
item “July>> January” required the response 6. The alphabetical
distance task required counting the amount of letters from a start
to an end letter. For example, the item “H > > L” required the
response 4. The respective items for the four tasks were chosen
such that all items are responded to with one-digit numbers;
participants pressed the corresponding numbers of the number
pad of a standard keyboard.
Each task was presented at a fixed location on the screen
(location and task mapping was counterbalanced between
participants). Most importantly, participants simultaneously saw
one item for each task (see Figure 1) and each specific item
remained on the screen as long as the participant did not answer
to this item. Thus, the respectively next items for the four tasks
were presented in parallel and consequently participants could
operate on the tasks simultaneously (like in PRP studies). Yet,
responding to each task was strictly sequential (like in task
switching paradigms). In each trial, the actual relevant task first
had to be determined.
In the “free choice condition,” participants themselves
indicated which task they chose by a left-hand response. Then
a rectangle appeared that surrounded the item of the chosen
task to confirm this task choice and participants responded to
the item of this task. After responding, feedback was shown for
1000 ms before the next trial started. A new item was presented
at the location of the performed task; the items that had not
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FIGURE 1 | Trial sequence. Participants in the free choice condition choose a task with their left hand and type in the correct digit with their right hand. The trials
sequence for participants in the cued condition was similar except that participants simply started the trial by pressing a key.
been responded to remained on the screen. Thus, during the
feedback screen participants could use the preview of the items
for the non-chosen tasks. We instructed participants in the free
choice condition to choose tasks to respond as fast and as accurate
as possible without following a predetermined strategy like for
example to choose tasks in clock-wise order or to always alternate
between two tasks.
To equalize the number of responses of the free choice and
cued task condition, participants in the cued task condition were
requested to press any of the four task keys to start the next
trial. Then a rectangle appeared surrounding the item of one
task to indicate that this was the currently relevant task. Similar
to the free choice condition, participants in the cued group
were encouraged to respond as fast and as accurate as possible.
However, unlike to the free choice condition, participants did
not know which item would be required in the next trial.
Consequently, participants in the free choice condition could
use the preview to work on an item that they would choose
while participants in the cued condition could use the preview to
work on any of the three remaining items yet without knowing
when this item will be required. Please note, however, that
even in the forced choice condition, it is perfectly rational to
use the preview to work on any of the three remaining items
because each single item remained on the screen until it became
cued/relevant.
In order to compare free choice and cued task conditions, we
considered several global measures to analyze whether conditions
were differentially stressful/effortful. First, the concept of ego-
depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998) assumes that self-control and
choice processes are resource-consuming and lead to fatigue,
that is impairment in a subsequently required unrelated task. In
order to assess fatigue, participants performed a Stroop task that
followed the main experiment (e.g., Webb and Sheeran, 2003;
Inzlicht et al., 2006; Gailliot et al., 2007). Further, we assessed the
amount of subjectively experienced stress on a scale by Eilers et al.
(1986), and the amount of payment participants would consider
fair for this kind of work (Thaler, 1980). To control for changes
in mood, we assessed affect with explicit rating and with the
“implicite positive and negative affect test” (IPANAT, Quirin et al.,
2009).
In addition, we considered local task performance measures
(RT and error rates) depending on whether participants switched
or repeated the task, and we considered time to start the trial
(time to choose a task in the free choice condition, and time
to start the trial in the cued condition). To get a combined
measure, we additionally computed the total work time, that is
the sum of RT and time to start the trial. Please note that with
this design, RT is measured from the onset of the task choice
response (free choice condition) or the onset of the response
to start the trial (cued task condition) until response. Because
the items for each task were presented on the screen before, RT
does not indicate the core time to perform this item. Thus, it
is necessary to conjointly consider the time until participants
choose a task/started the trial and the RT to assess the total work
time. Further, we assessed the characteristic of the task choices
in free choice condition. In addition to frequency of repetitions,
we assessed whether switches occurred between task categories
or across task categories. Within this regard, we considered
the summation and subtraction task as one task category and
the distance month task and the alphabetical distance task as
another task category because of the similarities regarding stimuli
(numbers vs. words/letters) and required cognitive operation
(computation vs. distance assessment).
Method
Participants
Forty-eight participants were paid 10 €for participation. Data of
one participant had to be excluded due to technical problems and
data of another participant were excluded because the participant
did not finish the experiment in the given time slot. To control
for task transitions, we also excluded the data of the respectively
yoked participants. Thus, data of 44 participants (seven men,
two left-handed, 18–56 years) were analyzed. All participants
were tested within 2 weeks in sessions that lasted approximately
90 min. The first 10 participants were assigned to the voluntary
group and the next ten participants were yoked to the first 10
participants and tested under the cue condition. This procedure
was repeated for the remaining participants.
Stimuli
In the main experimental task, target stimuli were presented in
white (Courrier New, 18) on black background. Tasks comprised
of two simple math tasks that required the addition or subtraction
of two digits (results ranged from 1 to 9, e.g., “3-2”) and of
two simple counting tasks. In the counting tasks, participants
were to indicate either the numerical distance between two letters
(with a maximal distance of 6, e.g., “G > > L”) or between
two calendar months (likewise with a maximal distance of 6,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 111
fpsyg-08-00111 February 2, 2017 Time: 18:43 # 5
Kiesel and Dignath Effort in Multitasking
e.g., March > > January). Each task comprised of 36 different
items.
In the Stroop task, color words were the German words for
“BLUE,” “GREEN,” “YELLOW” and “RED” printed in blue, green,
yellow, or red. For congruent words, the print color of the
word matched the meaning of the word, while for incongruent
words both colors mismatched. Only four combinations of
incongruent words were presented to a specific participant to
ensure presentation of individual congruent and incongruent
Stroop items in equal frequencies (c.f. Melara and Algom, 2003).
For this subset of incongruent color words, the assignment of the
ink color to the meaning of the color word was counterbalanced
across participants.
Procedure
Main experimental (task switching) task
Participants performed nine blocks and in each block participants
had to respond to 36 items per task, thus in total to 144
items per block. The first block was considered as training
block and was not analyzed. Each task was presented at a fixed
location on the screen (counterbalanced between participants).
The four different task items were presented around a central
fixation cross. Importantly, participants simultaneously saw
one item for each task (see Figure 1). Thus, the respectively
next items for the four tasks were presented in parallel
and consequently participants could operate on the tasks
simultaneously.
In the free choice group, participants indicated their task
choice with an overt response (cf. Arrington and Logan, 2005)
by pressing the keys “w,” “a,” “s,” or “d” using the index finger of
their left hand. Participants answered the tasks using the index
finger of their right hand by pressing the numbers 1 – 9 on
the number block. Participants were instructed to perform the
tasks as fast as possible. Regarding task choice they were asked to
choose in each trial the items they wanted to without following
a fixed pre-determined strategy like for example rotating task-
order clockwise and without choosing the same task more than
2 or 3 times in a row.
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in an experimental trial
for the free choice group. A fixation cross was presented on the
middle of the screen surrounded by the four tasks until a task
was selected with a spatially congruent key press. The selected
task was marked with a white frame and the fixation cross was
replaced by a matrix of digits from 1 to 9. When a response
was registered, the background color of the corresponding digit
changed for 1000 ms from black to green in case of correct
response or to red in case of an error. The next trial started
directly with the presentation of a new item at the location of
the just performed task; the non-chosen items remained on the
screen. Items of a task were randomly administered. Whenever
a participant had performed all 36 items of a task in a block,
the signs “XXXX” were presented at the task location and
participants had to choose among the remaining tasks. After each
block there was a break and participants received feedback about
the number of errors and the total time it took them to perform
all tasks in the last block. When participants felt ready for the next
block they terminated the break.
The procedure for participants in the cued group was
identical, except that participants did not select task by
themselves, but started a ‘random generator’ by pressing a start
key (the same keys served as start keys than in the free choice
group). The presented task and trial sequences, however, were not
random, but yoked to one of the participants in the free choice
group.
Stroop task
After performing the task switching experiment, participants
were instructed to respond to the ink color of a word by pressing
the keys ‘a,’ ‘x,’ ‘l’ or ‘m’ using the index and middle fingers
of their left and right hands. The assignment of the response
buttons to the ink color was counterbalanced across participants.
At the start of a trial, a fixation-cross was presented for 300 ms
followed by a colored word which prompted the participant to
respond as quickly as possible. After 1000 ms, a blank screen was
presented until registration of a key press. In case of an incorrect
or late response (RT > 1000 ms), an error message appeared
for 1000 ms. The next trial started after an intertrial interval of
1000 ms. The Stroop task consisted of four blocks with eight
congruent and eight incongruent trials each.
Questionnaires
To assess explicit affect rating, participants indicated their current
mood by clicking with the mouse cursor on a scale from 0 [very
negative] – 100 [very positive] directly before and after the main
experimental task (i.e., the task switching part). After performing
the Stroop task, participants filled out the “implicit positive and
negative affect test” (IPANAT, Quirin et al., 2009).
To assess subjective experience of fatigue and demand,
participants answered the “scale to assess subjective experience
of stress” (Eilers et al., 1986)2. Furthermore, we adopted a
“compensation demanded measure,” a standard procedure from
behavioral economics (e.g., Thaler, 1980; Knetsch and Sinden,
1984) to assess how much payment per hour participants
considered as a fair compensation for their participation in the
experiment.
Results
Global Measures to Assess Fatigue/Stress
Stroop task
After the experiment, participants performed a Stroop task
to assess fatigue. For the analysis, the first trial of the block
was excluded and for the RT analyses, only correct trials
were included. Participants responded slower, F(1,42) = 11.86,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.220 and made more errors, F(1,42) = 21.29,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.336 in Stroop incongruent compared to Stroop
congruent trials3. Most importantly, participants in the free
choice condition committed overall more errors than participants
2Participants also answered to an adaptation of the “NASA Task Load Index”
(NASA-TLX, Hart and Staveland, 1988), yet due to failures in the translation these
data could not be analyzed.
3The overall error rate (M = 38.1%) in the Stroop task was considerably high.
However, this is a typical pattern for a brief manual Stroop task that requires
participants to memorize a 4-color-key mapping rule without training and a
considerable short response deadline (c.f. Dignath and Eder, 2015).
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in the cued condition, F(1,42) = 4.99, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.106,
while response time did not differ significantly but also did not
indicate any speed-accuracy tradeoff, F(1,42) = 2.60, p = 0.114,
η2p = 0.058, see Table 1 for means.
Subjectively experienced stress
Participants reported more subjectively experienced stress in
the free choice condition compared to the cued condition,
t(42) = 2.1, p = 0.041. The amount of payment per hours
that participants demanded for compensation for a future
participation differed between conditions, t(394)= 2.2, p= 0.036.
Participants in the free choice condition indicated that 25,15 Euro
per hour would be a fair payment for this work while participants
in the cued task group considered 12,48 Euro per hour as fair
payment.
Affect
In order to test the influence of choice condition on explicit
affect, while controlling for potential differences in pre-test affect,
we used the analysis of covariance approach (Senn, 2006). Post-
test affect rating were entered into a univariate ANCOVA with
choice condition (free vs. cued) as the between-participants factor
and pre-test mean Mood ratings as the covariate. This analysis
revealed no significant difference between groups, F < 1.
Implicit affect rating assessed by the IPANAT did not differ
between groups, neither for positive affect nor negative affect,
both |t| < 1.5
Taken together, participants in the free choice condition were
more fatigued and experienced more stress than participants in
the cued condition, yet this was not due to any impact on affect
but seems to indicate that this condition is more effortful.
Local Task Switching Performance
The first trial in each block was not analyzed. Post-error trials
(6.3%) and RTs that exceeded more than 2.5 SDs from the
cell mean for each condition (4.4%) were removed from all
analyses. Additionally trials with erroneous responses (5.2%)
were removed from all analyses (except analysis of error data).
If not stated otherwise, a repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the factors condition (free choice, cued) and task
transition (repeat, switch) was used to analyze the data.
Task performance (reaction times and errors)
Participants in the free choice condition responded faster than
participants in the cued condition, F(1,42) = 22.6, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.35. Participants responded faster in task switch than in
task repetition trials, F(1,42) = 17.7, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.30. In
addition, participants made less errors in task switch than in task
repetition trials, F(1,42) = 4.8, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.10, and this
switch advantage in errors occurred mainly in the free choice
group, F(1,42) = 4.1, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.09. All other effects were
not significant (p > 0.45).
4Degree of freedoms differs for this analysis because some participants did not
answer this question.
5Data of one participant who did not fill out the IPANAT is missing. TA
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Task choice times
Regarding the time to choose a task/start the trial, participants
in the free choice condition took longer than participants in the
cued task condition, F(1,42) = 14.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.26, and
especially so when they repeated tasks rather than switched tasks,
F(1,42) = 26.7, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.39 for the main effect of
task switch, qualified by the interaction of switch × condition,
F(1,42)= 21.1, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33.
Total work time
When considering the sum of RT and choice time/time to start
a trial (see Figure 2), total work time of participants in the
free choice condition and in the cued condition did not differ
significantly, F(1,42) = 3.1, p = 0.088, η2p = 0.07. Participants
responded faster in task switch than in task repetition trials,
F(1,42) = 38.4, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48, and this switch advantage
was larger in the free choice condition than in the cued
condition, F(1,42) = 9.7, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.19. Two-tailed
one-sample t-tests against null revealed switch benefits both
for participants in the free choice condition and in the cued
condition, t(22) = 6.45, p > 0.001, d = 1.37 and t(21) = 2.36,
p= 0.028, d = 0.51.
Task choices
Overall, Participants repeated tasks in 31.6% of the trials.
This repetition rate does not differ significantly from the 25%
repetition rate that would result if participants randomly chose
task order, t(21) = 1.4, p = 0.168, d = 0.29. To further analyze
task choices, we considered only trials in a block as long as all
four stacks for each task had items. For this subsample of trials,
participants repeated tasks in 26.8% of the trials. This repetition
rate does not differ significantly from the 25% repetition rate
that would result if participants randomly chose task order, |t|
< 1. When switching between tasks, participants switched to the
similar task in 30.0% of the trials and to the two other dissimilar
tasks in 43.2% of the trials. The switch rate within task categories
was significantly above chance of 25%, t(21) = 2.54, p = 0.019,
d = 0.54, while switches to the two dissimilar tasks occurred
less frequently than expected by change of 50%, t(21) = 1.82,
p= 0.083, d = 0.38.
Discussion
The present experiment aimed to elaborate on an experimental
setting that allows to identify conditions supporting multitasking.
We introduced an experimental set-up that requires task
switching but allows parallel processing of alternative task
items to contrast self-organization and externally controlled
task switching. In addition, to local performance measures,
we also assessed global subjective and objective measures
for effort. Results revealed a rather interesting data pattern.
First, participants responded slower, made more errors, and
total work time was larger for task repetition trials than
task switch trials. Thus, in contrast to the usually observed
task switch costs (see Kiesel et al., 2010 for a review), here
reversed switch costs, that is, switch benefits emerged. This
finding can easily be explained because the items for the
non-chosen task remained on the screen. Because of this
possibility to preview the items for task switches (see Figure 1),
participants were able to work on these items while they
received feedback for the just performed task. The feedback
was given for 1000 ms and consequently participants had
ample time to work on the alternative tasks’ items after
responding.
Second, participants repeated tasks more often than expected
by chance. This finding seem at odds with the observation that
participants were able to respond faster in task switch than
in task repetition trials. Yet, based on typical task switching
experiments (for an overview see e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010;
Vandierendonck et al., 2010), we know that task switching
requires an effortful reconfiguration process and participants
might avoid this process. We will come back later to this issue in
the general discussion. Additionally, when participants switched
tasks, they more often switched to the similar task category (from
the addition to the subtraction task and vice versa or from the
letter to the month distance task and vice versa) than expected by
chance. We take this as a hint that participants choose tasks such
that task switching was facilitated.
Finally, and most interestingly, participants in the free choice
condition seemed to be more fatigued than participants in
the cued condition and they subjectively experienced more
stress. This finding is at odds with the observation that
FIGURE 2 | Global measures of effort: (A) The percentage of errors committed during the Stroop task, (B) the amount of payment participants considered as a
fair compensation for performing the task and (C) the subjectively experienced stress during the experiment plotted for the free (triangles, straight line) and yoked
(circles, dotted line) group for Experiment 1 (preview = 1000 ms) and Experiment 2 (preview = 200 ms). Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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participants in the free choice condition responded faster in task
switch trials than participants in the cued condition. Thus, the
objective and subjective assessment of overall effort contradict
the performance measures. Usually one would assume that faster
responses occur for easier and thus less stressful conditions.
Consequently, based on the performance data one might
have predicted that participants in the free choice condition
would be less fatigued and stressed than participants in the
cued group. To account for these findings, we assume that
participants in the free choice condition experienced more effort
when considering global measures because the requirement to
schedule tasks in order to respond as fast as possible (i.e., in
order to optimize local performance) is demanding and thus
induces stress and leads to fatigue. Yet, participants in the
free choice condition were faster in task switch trials when
considering local measures because their task choice enabled
them to act more efficiently and thus to take more advantage
from the possibility to preview the items in case of task
switches.
Before we elaborate more on such a possible trade-off between
local performance benefits and global effort costs, we have
to consider an alternative explanation of Experiment 1. Task
instruction for the free-choice group stated that participants
should avoid pre-determined strategy like for example rotating
task-order clockwise and without repeating the same task more
than 2 or 3 times in a row. Arguably, this is a considerable
additional task demand that might explain why participants in
the free choice group were more fatigued after the experiment
compared to the cued group without this demand. Indeed,
previous research on voluntary task switching has shown
that instructions to avoid specific choice patterns is cognitive
demanding and impairs local performance (e.g., Mayr and Bell,
2006). Therefore, it is possible that global costs in terms of
increased fatigue in the free choice group were due to difference
in task instruction.
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the long preview in
combination with the possibility to select freely tasks resulted in
beneficial task performance/more fatigue or whether free choice
alone would have been sufficient to induce these effects. More
precisely, it remains to be tested whether self-organization of
task selection could is effortful (in terms of global costs) even
without any local performance benefits. In order to test these
assumptions we decided to run a second Experiment without
reduced possibility to preview the non-chosen items.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we applied a similar experimental procedure
than in Experiment 1, but we now reduced the time of the
feedback after responding to the item of a task to 200 ms.
We hypothesize that this massive reduction of the possibility to
preview the non-chosen items before participants can choose
a task, changes task choice behavior so that free choice of
the task sequence does no longer support local performance.
Thus, we predict that in Experiment 2 with reduced possibility
to preview the items, local performance in the free choice
condition and the cued task switch condition should not differ.
In addition, we assume that if global costs (increased fatigue)
result from local performance benefits (total work time), we
do not expect any difference in global costs in Experiment 2.
Consequently, we hypothesize that the global assessment of
effort for participants in the free choice and cued task switching
conditions does not differ. In contrast, if global costs result
from task choice processes irrespective of a stimulus-strategy
or if global costs result from the demanding task switch
instruction, global assessment of effort should be increased
for participants in the free choice compared to the cued task
switching group.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight participants (eight men, three left-handed,
18–56 years) took part in exchange for course credits or
10€ were analyzed. All participants were tested in sessions that
lasted approximately 90 min. The first ten participants were
assigned to the voluntary group and the next ten participants
were yoked to the first ten participants and tested under the
cue condition. This procedure was repeated for the remaining
participants.
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli and procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except for
the following. In the main Experiment, we reduced the time of
the feedback to 200 ms. When a response was registered, this
response was shown in the middle of the screen in a square with
green background in case of correct responses or red background
in case of an error. During this feedback, the items for all
four tasks remained on the screen. After 200 ms, the feedback
disappeared and a new item appeared at the location of the just
chosen task. For the subjective measures, we did not assess the
IPANAT in Experiment 2 because this measure was not sensitive
in Experiment 1.
Results
Global Measures to Assess Fatigue/Stress
Stroop task
The first trial of the block was excluded and for the RT analyses,
only correct trials were included. Participants responded slower,
F(1,46) = 23.14, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.335 and made more errors,
F(1,46) = 26.24, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.363 in Stroop incongruent
compared to Stroop congruent trials. Performance of participants
in the free choice condition and in the cued condition did not
differ, F< 1 for RT and errors see Figure 2 and Table 1 for means.
Subjectively experienced stress
Neither participants’ reported stress did not differ between the
conditions, t(46)= 1.45, p= 0.15, nor the amount of payment per
hours that participants demanded for compensation for a future
participation did differ between conditions, |t| < < 1.
Affect
As in Experiment 1, mood ratings did not differ between groups,
F < 1.
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To summarize, participants in the free choice condition and
participants in the cued condition did not differ significantly
regarding fatigue and experienced stress.
Local Task Switching Performance
The first trial in each block was not analyzed. Post-error trials
(7.3%) and RTs that exceeded more than 2.5 SDs from the
cell mean for each condition (4.6%) were removed from all
analyses. Additionally trials with erroneous responses (5.5%)
were removed from all analyses (except analysis of error data). As
in Experiment 1, a repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
condition (free choice, cued) and task transition (repeat, switch)
was used to analyze the data.
Task performance (reaction times and errors)
Participants in the free choice condition responded faster than
participants in the cued condition, F(1,46) = 15.6, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.25. The response times did not differ significantly
in task switch and in task repetition trials, F(1,46) = 2.65,
p = 0.11, η2p = 0.055, and there was no significant interaction of
switch× condition, F(1,46)= 0.5, p= 0.82, η2p = 0.001. Analysis
of error rates did not reveal a difference for participants in the free
and yoked group, F(1,46) = 0.3, p = 0.86, η2p = 0.001. Further,
there was no significant difference between switch and repetition
trials, F(1,46) = 2.11, p = 0.15, η2p = 0.044, and no significant
interaction, F(1,46)= 0.14, p= 0.71, η2p = 0.003.
Task choice times
Regarding the time to choose a task/start the trial, participants
in the free choice condition took longer than participants in the
cued task condition, F(1,46) = 19.2, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29. Yet,
task choice times did not differ significantly for task switches or
repetitions, F(1,46) = 1.07, p = 0.31, η2p = 0.023 for the main
effect of task switch, and for the interaction of switch x condition,
F(1,46)= 1.12, p= 0.30, η2p = 0.024.
Total work time
When considering the sum of RT and choice time/time to
start a trial (see Figure 2), response times did not differ
for participants in the free choice condition and in the cued
condition, F(1,46) = 1.49 p = 0.23, η2p = 0.031. Further, total
work time did not differ for task switch and task repetition trials,
F(1,46) = 0.046, p = 0.83, η2p = 0.001, and the interaction of
switch× condition was not significant, F(1,46)= 0.748, p= 0.39,
η2p = 0.016.
Task choices
Overall, Participants repeated tasks in 50.9% of the trials. This
repetition rate is significantly larger than the 25% repetition
rate that would result if participants randomly chose task order,
t(23) = 4.32, p < 0.001, d = 0.88. To further analyze task
choices, we considered only trials in a block as long as all four
stacks for each task had items. For this subsample of trials,
participants repeated tasks in 48.5% of the trials. This repetition
rate is significantly larger than the 25% repetition rate that would
result if participants randomly chose task order, t(23) = 3.88,
p < 0.001, d = 0.79. When switching between task, participants
switched to the similar task in 22.8% of the trials and to the
two other dissimilar tasks in 28.6% of the trials. The switch
rate within task categories did not significantly differ chance of
25%, |t| < 1 while switches to the two dissimilar tasks occurred
less frequently than expected by change of 50%, t(23) = 5.84,
p < 0.001, d = 1.19.
BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL
COMPARISON
To compare the results of Experiments 1 and 2, we added the
between-factor Experiment to the respective ANOVAs reported
for Experiments 1 and 2. Only effects of interest, i.e., the
interaction with Experiment are reported.
Global Measures to Assess
Fatigue/Stress
For the error rates in Stroop task, the difference in the free
compared to the cued condition was more pronounced in
Experiment 1 (1= 15.23%) than in Experiment 2 (1=−3.51%),
as indicated by the significant interaction between Experiment
and group (free, cued) and F(1,88) = 4.80, p = 0.031, η2p
= 0.052. While the difference for the free and cued switching
group was stronger for subjectively reported stress in Experiment
1 (1 = 23.31) compared to Experiment 2 (1 = 17.12), this
difference was not significant, F < 1. However, the difference
between free and cued switching group in terms of the
amount of payment per hours that participants demanded for
compensation was significant (Experiment 1, 1 = 12.67 €;
Experiment 2, 1 = 0.43 €), F(1,88) = 5.07, p = .027, η2p
= 0.056.
Local Task Switching Performance
Task Performance (Reaction Times and Errors)
The difference in task performance for free and yoked groups was
not different between Experiments (four-way interaction with
F < 1). Although there was a tendency for overall switch benefits
in Experiments 1 (1 = 425 ms) and switch costs Experiment 2
(1 = 56 ms) irrespective of free/ yoked group, this difference
was only marginal significant, F(1,89) = 3.14, p = 0.08, η2p
= 0.034. For errors rates, the four-way interaction was marginal
significant, F(1,89) = 3.14, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.034, showing a
tendency for greater switch benefits in Experiments 1 for the free
compared to yoked group (1= 2.71 %) compared to Experiment
2 with the reverse patter, namely a switch benefit for the yoked
group (1= 0.47%).
Task Choice Times
The difference in switch costs/benefits for free compared to yoked
groups was significantly stronger in Experiment 1 compared
to Experiment 2, F(1,89) = 5.24, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.056. As
indicated by the individual analysis, participants in Experiment
1 showed a pronounced switch benefit in the free choice group
against the yoked group (1 = 334 ms), while participants in
Experiment 2 showed strong switch costs in the free choice group
against the yoked group (1= 251 ms).
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Total Work Time
The difference in switch costs/benefits for free compared to yoked
groups was significantly stronger in Experiment 1 compared
to Experiment 2, F(1,89) = 4.79, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.051. As
indicated by the individual analysis, participants in Experiment
1 showed a pronounced switch benefit in the free choice group
against the yoked group (1 = 425 ms), while participants in
Experiment 2 showed strong switch costs in the free choice group
against the yoked group (1= 56 ms) (see Figure 3).
Task Choices
Repetition rate was higher for Experiment 2 compared to
Experiment1, t(44) = 2.75, p = 0.009, d = 0.082. Furthermore,
within switches and across task switches were lower in
Experiment 2 compared Experiment 1 |t| (44) = 2.14, p = 0.038,
d = 0.063 and |t| (44)= 2.77, p= 0.08, d = 0.082.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we assessed local performance measures
and global measures of stress and fatigue in a setting that
resembles the setting of Experiment 1. Yet, in contrast to
Experiment 1, the feedback screen after responding in a trial
was presented for 200 ms only, before the new item for
the just chosen task occurred (while the items for the non-
chosen tasks remained the same). This reduction of preview
for the non-chosen items lead to a rather different response
pattern than in Experiment 1. Local performance measures
showed no advantage for switch compared to repetition trials.
Arguably, a 200 ms preview is not sufficient to facilitate task
switching significantly. Additionally, participants in the free
choice condition responded faster, yet they took longer to choose
a task than participants in the cues condition. When considering
the combined measure of total work time, there was no significant
difference for both conditions. It seems that participants in
the free choice group waited to indicate their task choice such
that they were able to respond faster. Yet, overall participants’
choice behavior could not optimize task performance due to
the lack of preview. Similarly, global measures to assess fatigue
and stress did not differ in the free choice and the cued
task switching group. Thus, taken together there were no
significant local differences and no global differences (only in one
measure marginally different) in the free choice and the cued
group in Experiment 2. This suggests that preview is actually
necessary to choose tasks in a way that supports optimized
behavior.
Please note that this finding is also suitable to rule out
two objections against Experiment 1. First, one might suppose
that participants in the free choice condition experienced
more effort than participants in the cued condition, because
they were instructed to choose a task without following a
fixed task sequences and without repeating tasks too often.
Yet, instructions how to choose tasks were the same in
Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, task choice instructions itself
cannot explain differences between free choice and cued
group.
Further, task choice behavior in Experiment 2 revealed that
participants repeated tasks more often than expected by chance.
Due to the decreased preview, the advantages to switch tasks
were reduced and thus participants preferred the less demanding
task repetition option. When participants switched trials, they
did not switch more often than expected by chance to the
similar task category. It thus seems that the reduced possibility
FIGURE 3 | Local measures of performance costs displayed as the switch costs/benefits (repetition time – switch time) calculated for the total work
time (task choice + task performance) for the free and cued group of Experiment 1 (preview = 1000 ms) and Experiment 2 (preview = 200 ms).
Asterisks indicate significant differences. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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to preview likewise reduced the possibility to optimize task
scheduling.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we assessed local performance measures
as well global measures for effort in a multitasking setting
comparing free choice of task order and cued task order.
Participants in the free choice condition scheduled task order
when switching between four different tasks. After performing
an item for one task, participants received feedback either for
1000 ms (Experiment 1) or for 200 ms (Experiment 2) while the
items for the non-chosen tasks remained the same. Consequently,
participants could use the feedback time as a preview to prepare
for the alternative tasks and in the free choice condition to choose
a task order that optimizes performance. Results in Experiment
1 indicated that participants in the free choice condition were
faster than participants in the cued condition, yet global measure
of effort revealed that they were more stressed and fatigue after
the experiment. In contrast, in Experiment 2 with largely reduced
preview, neither local nor global measures for the free choice and
the cued group differed.
To account for these results, we speculate that there are
three mechanisms that interact with each other:(i) advance
item processing due to preview, (ii) reconfiguration required
in task switch trials, and (iii) a task choice process (in free
choice condition) that aims to optimize reconfiguration and task
processing.
First, we suppose that participants responded faster in task
switch than in task repetition trials, because the preview time
allowed participants to prepare (and possibly even solve) the next
task before the start of a trial.
Second, we assume that in addition to the possibility to
work in advance on the task-switch items, another process
impacts on task choice/task performance that prevents frequent
task switching. Task switching requires a reconfiguration
process to adopt the new task set (see Figure 4). This
reconfiguration process is an executive control process and
requires cognitive resources (e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995;
Meiran, 1996; Koch, 2001; Hoffmann et al., 2003; Plessow
et al., 2011; Plessow et al., 2012). To avoid the cognitive
demand that is related to task switches, participants prefer
to repeat a task. Thus, our results seem to be in line
with the “law of least mental effort” (Kool et al., 2010,
p. 678).
FIGURE 4 | In both the free choice (upper) and the cued condition (lower) preview facilitates responding in task switch compared to task repetition
trials. Yet, task switching requires reconfiguration; thus, the advantages of preview are attenuated. In the free choice condition (upper), the process to freely choose
a task is effortful and time-consuming, yet it aims to optimize reconfiguration (and possible) task processing and thus facilitates responding in switch trials in the free
choice condition.
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Indeed, research in the voluntary task switching paradigm
further supports this assumption that participants avoid cognitive
demand. A number of studies revealed that when participants
were instructed to randomly choose a task, they usually repeated
tasks more often than expected by chance (e.g., Arrington and
Logan, 2004, 2005; Mayr and Bell, 2006; Yeung, 2010; Reuss et al.,
2011). This repetition bias seems reasonable because in these
voluntary task switching experiments, task switch cost emerged.
Yet, in the current setting participants responded faster in task
switch trials because the items for the tasks remained on the
screen and because of this preview possibility participants were
able to work on the previously non-chosen items (the items
that would be chosen in task switch trials) while the feedback
screen was presented. Nevertheless, despite responding faster
in task switch trials, participants did not prefer task switches
over task repetitions. This observation is interesting because
it might question the assumption that self-organization, that
is, free choice of task order is suitable to optimize overall
task performance. Further research is needed to clarify whether
participants are able to balance performance benefits (or costs)
in an experimental setting with the effort of task reconfiguration
processes. Currently, we can only speculate why participants
did not choose the faster option more often. It might be that
participants were not aware that they would be faster in task
switch trials or alternatively, the reconfiguration process might
induce some level of conflict and thereby negative affect (e.g.,
Botvinick, 2007; Dignath et al., 2015).
Third, we assume that the task choice process for participants
in the free choice group is not only affected by the necessity to
reconfigure but also itself impacts on reconfiguration and task
performance. Here, a central conjecture is that the task choice
process aims to optimize task performance and effort related to
task processing (e.g., Shenhav et al., 2013). In the setting of the
present study, the task choice process has to balance the tendency
to (1) avoid task switches to avoid reconfiguration processes,
and (2) to exploit the preview possibility and thus to prefer
task switches. Interestingly, results revealed that participants
responded faster in task switch than in task repetitions trials,
yet they did not switch tasks more often (indeed descriptively
they even repeated tasks more often) than would be expected for
random task choices. Thus, the usual conclusion that fast RTs
indicate easy task conditions that are preferred by participants
does not hold in this setting.
In addition, the task choice process is an executive control
process and as such requires cognitive resources. Despite that
participants in the free choice condition needed less time than
participants in the cued condition to perform a task especially
in task switch trials, subjective evaluation measures and after-
effects in a Stroop task indicated that the free choice condition
is more stressful/effortful than the cued task condition. Based on
this observation, we conclude that assessment of overall effort
(with subjective and objective measures) is an additional factor
that should be considered in addition to performance data when
comparing different multitasking conditions.
Taken together, participants in the free choice condition
were more fatigued than participants in the cued condition
and they subjectively experienced more stress. Thus, despite
participants in the free choice condition needed less time than
participants in the cued condition to perform a task especially
in task switch trials, subjective evaluation measures and after-
effects in a Stroop task indicated that the free choice condition
is more stressful/effortful than the cued task condition. To
conclude the present experiment suggests that task organization
in multitasking depicts a trade-off. While self-organization of task
scheduling can optimize task performance during multitasking, it
comes at the costs of more fatigue after multitasking.
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